International E-Banking: ICT Investments and the Basel Accord by Lin, Hong-Jen & Lin, Winston T.
International E-Banking: 
ICT Investments and the Basel Accord
by
Hong-Jen Lin
City University of New York, U.S.A.
Winston T. Lin
State University of New York at Buffalo, U.S.A.
This study investigates how the Basel Accord and Information and Telecommuni-
cations Technologies (ICT) investments affect the commercial banking industries 
across countries. We employ the stochastic frontier approach to explore a data set 
composed of commercial banks from 51 countries. We find that telecommunica-
tions investment reduces, and the Basel Accord proxy enhances, the cost efficiency 
of commercial banks under study. Moreover, it is found that ICT investments im-
prove cost efficiencies of commercial banks for countries in which the regulations 
are consistent with the international supervision. 
1. Introduction
During the past decade, commercial banks have witnessed dramatic change 
in information and telecommunications technologies (called ICT hereinafter). For 
instance, the use of electronic communication, such as electronic bill paying, home 
banking, and internet transaction, has been altering the relationship of business-to-
business (B2B) and business-to-customer (B2C). The marketing accessibility of 
financial institutions is extended and increased to remote areas or countries via the 
new telecommunications technology. Hence, the role of ICT investments becomes 
more important in the banking industry. This trend is also called e-banking.
 The impacts of ICT in banking are categorized into three categories: 1) 
globalization, 2) deregulation, and 3) consolidation (Nieto, 2001). First, commer-
cial banks can outreach remote clients via electronic communications devices to 
the extent that foreign customers are able to process transactions across national 
borders. Thus, the banking markets are marching toward globalization. Second, 
accompanying globalization, deregulation in the banking industry prevails in many 
countries in order to improve the competitive strength of the financial industry of 
a nation. Third, new technologies also enlarge the capacities of financial institu-
tions and thus improve their cost efficiency. Therefore, more and more commercial 
banks have merged together to attain a higher level of efficiency than before.
These issues on e-banking are international. Since the consolidation of fi-
nancial institutions may take place across countries with different regulatory rules, 
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the international supervision on the banking regulation is urgent. In other words, we 
must set up proper international banking regulations in order to satisfy the needs of 
the international e-banking. Via the efforts of international regulations such as the 
Basel Accord,1 customers can be securely protected, transactions can be smoothly 
processed, and operations are tightly monitored by the supervisory bodies who join 
this Accord. The Basel Accord requires commercial banks in member countries 
to maintain adequate capitals and disclose related information to the public. Con-
sequently, commercial banks become more transparent across countries and thus, 
more efficient than ever before.
This paper differentiates itself from previous studies in several aspects.  First, 
this research is devoted to the impact of ICT investments in commercial banking. 
Many previous studies (e.g., Hunter and Timme, 1991, among others) have ex-
plored the ‘technological change’, instead of the ICT investments, of commercial 
banks, while the concept of technological change is too broad. Second, not many 
efforts have been made on the international comparison in commercial banking. 
One of the few exceptions is Allen and Rai (1996). Nevertheless, their efforts do 
not involve commercial banks in emerging economies. Third, previous IT research 
focuses on the effect of IT investments on the productivity of non-financial indus-
tries (or across industries) rather than the effect of ICT investments on the banking 
industry. Fourth, this is a pioneering attempt to link the impact of ICT investments 
to that of international banking regulations.
The objective of this study is twofold: first, to address the question-‘do ICT 
investments contribute to commercial banks?’ and, second, to investigate the ques-
tion- ‘does the countries joined the Basel Accord outperform those non-Basel Ac-
cord countries in terms of cost efficiencies?’  In essence, we would like to explore 
the sources of the cost efficiency of international commercial banking: is it from 
regulations or from ICT investments? or from both? In the methodological issues, 
it is worth noting that the efficiency analysis has become dominant in the research 
of financial institutions. We follow this convention but adopt a more generalized 
stochastic frontier approach to estimate cost efficiency (Wang and Schmidt, 2002). 
Our approach is shown empirically and theoretically superior to previous ones. The 
remainder of this research is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the meth-
odologies used and Section 3 provides the data sources and statistical hypotheses. 
Section 4 presents and analyzes empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodologies 
This section is designed to specify the estimation models on which the anal-
ysis is based. We explain the measure of cost efficiency, often used in the literature 
of financial institutions. 
The present section consists of three subsections. Subsection 2.1 introduces 
notations of the variables used and details the choices of ICT proxies. Subsection 
2.2 discusses methodological issues regarding cost efficiency. Finally, Subsection 
2.3 specifies the estimation models.
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2.1 Notations and ICT Proxies
The variables used in this study are classified into five categories: dependent 
variables, output variables, input prices, control variables, and ICT proxies, where 
output variables and input prices are key variables in the traditional stochastic fron-
tier analysis. The notations used are described as follows:
The dependent variable of the cost frontier is LNTCit where
  
and the subscripts i  and t denote bank i at time t. The output variables are 
represented by a vector of output yit that includes:
where
and
The vector of input prices is denoted by pit: (e.g., the wage of labor and 
price of capital), which is listed as follows:
where wit is the wage rate,
€ 
LNTC it = ln(
TC it
TAit
)
€ 
TC it = 	the	sum	of	a	bank' s	operating	and	interest	costs
€ 
TAit = total	assets
€ 
LNLN it = ln(LN it /TAit )
€ 
LNTD it = ln(TDit /TAit )
€ 
LNFI it = ln(FI it /TAit )
€ 
LN it = 	the	sum	of	personal	loans, 	commercial	loans, 	
			property	and	real	estate	loans, 	and	industrial	loans
€ 
TDit = 	the	sum	of	demand	and	term	deposits
€ 
FI it = 	the	sum	of	long - term	and	short - term	investments
€ 
LN it TAit = 	the	ratio	of	total	loans	to	total	assets
€ 
TDit TAit = 	the	ratio	of	total	deposits	to	to	total	assets
€ 
FI it TAit = 	the	ratio	of	financial	investments	over	total	assets
€ 
LNW it = ln(wit /TAit )
€ 
LNC it = ln rit
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and rit is the real deposit rate,
€ 
rit = 	price	of	capital	in	real	term 2
Note that the scales of different banks in different countries vary widely, so 
do the variance of the firm-specific variables for different banks in different coun-
tries. In order to account for such heteroscedastic nature of commercial banks, TCit, 
TDit, FIit, LNit, and wit are measured in the comparative ratios to total assets. That 
is, the outputs, total costs, and wage rates are divided by the amount of the total 
assets (TAit) of the bank i at time t.
The control variables represented by country risk variables are:
€ 
FIN it = country	financial	risk
€ 
POL it = country	political	risk
€ 
ECO it = 	country	economic	risk
The three control variables are country-specific. Thus, they stay the same 
for different banks within a country and differ for banks for different countries. 
Although the dependent variable, the output variables, and the wage of labor are 
firm-specific, it is insightful to use country-specific control variables since the Ba-
sel proxy B and the ICT investments proxies are also country-specific variables 
(detailed in the following paragraphs).
This study uses three country risk indicators, financial risk, political risk, 
and economic risk as control variables, which are used in Chen and Lin (1994) and 
compiled by the PRS (Political Risk Services) Group Inc. (2001). Their country 
risk rating systems are detailed in Appendix. Since these three types of country risk 
indices reflect the time-varying and comparative risks of a country, it is necessary 
to incorporate them into the model as control variables while evaluating the impact 
of ICT.
ICT-related variables for a financial institution are not readily available, so 
the country-level proxies are used. The e-banking variables are not available, ei-
ther, so we are forced to use ICT proxies as the substitutes of e-banking variables.
In previous studies, either the country level IT capital stock (Dewan and 
Kraemer, 2000, and Daveri, 2001) or firm-level IT stock (Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 
1996; Lin and Shao, 2000; and Shao and Lin, 2000, 2001, 2002) is used to describe 
the contribution of IT to productivity or productive efficiency.  We follow Dewan 
and Kraemer (2000) for two reasons. First, our focal point for an international com-
parison is similar to theirs. Second, the firm-level data of IT capital stock is not 
available for many other countries. Thus, the country-level variables are used as 
proxies. In other words, the same ICT proxies apply for banks within a country.
Here, the growth rate of the IT capital stock (ITCS) is adopted and calcu-
lated as follows:
Lin & Lin
27
%100
1
1 ×
−
=
−
−
it
itit
it ITCS
ITCSITCS
IT
Telecommunications investments have increased rapidly in order to foster 
progress in IT, caused by the rapid development of the internet and telecommunica-
tions. Thus, the growth rate of telecommunications capital investments (COMCI) is 
used and calculated as follows:
%100
1
1 ×−=
−
−
it
itit
it COMCI
COMCICOMCI
COM
Based on the specification of IT and COM, we can examine how new technologies 
(ICT) influence the performance of financial institutions across nations. 
 
 The data of both ITCS and COMCI are defined as total revenue paid to 
vendors (including channel markups) for hardware, data communications, software, 
and services. Hence, these two variables are not seriously impacted by the various 
accounting methods of capital investments in different countries. Moreover, IT and 
COM are growth rates of ITCS and COMCI, which reduces the problems of mea-
suring errors caused by different currencies in different countries. And the results 
based on this data set are comparable across countries. Given that other official data 
sources are not available, this is the only source of information technology invest-
ments data for a large cross-section of countries in the 1990’s.  
 Since it is difficult to quantify what extent to which a country complies 
its regulations with the Basel Accord, we rely on dummy variable to deal with this 
problem. The Basel Accord variable B is defined as one if a country joins the Basel 
Accord, while B is equal to zero if a country does not.
2.2 Cost Efficiency
The stochastic frontier analysis is the one-step approach by Wang and 
Schmidt (2002). The one-step cost efficiency frontier model is applied to pool 
the cross-section of time-series (i.e., panel) data culled from commercial banks 
throughout the world to explore the dynamically and stochastically shifting pat-
terns of the cost (in)efficiencies of banks over time.3
The one-step model consisting of Equations (1) and (2) to examine the cost 
efficiency of commercial banks is illustrated as follows:
( ) tiitiit vu;fTC +++= γβ ittit zp,yln
and
( ) ititititit BCOMITgu εα += ;,,
[1]
[2]
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where  
ITit and COMit in the g-function are the ICT variable.
4 zit is a set of country-
specific control variables. B is the Basel Accord dummy. B=1, when a country joins 
the Basel Accord, Otherwise, B=0.  
€ 
α  is the vector  of unknown parameters to be 
estimated in the inefficiency itu . itε  is a truncated random variable (half-normally 
distributed) to account for the error term of the cost inefficiency. That is,
( )2,0~ vit Nv σ ,
( )( )|,;,,~| 2uitititit BCOMITgNu σα , and
( )|,0~| 2εσε Nit
2.3 Specifications of the Models
In Equations (1) and (2) the output vector yit (cf. Lin and Lin, 2005) consists 
of three output, LNit, TDit, and FIit. Due to the limitation of the availability of data, 
we are forced to use total deposits rather than demand deposits that have often been 
used in the related studies. 
The elements of the input price vector (pit) include wit and rit. Following 
Allen and Rai (1996), Rai (1996), and Lin and Lin (2005), the wage of labor is 
obtained by dividing the total staff expenses by the total number of reported em-
ployees of a bank. The total staff expenses and total number of reported employees 
for a given bank are collected from its financial statements. The price of capital 
is measured by the loan interest rate of the country. In Equation (2), both ITit and 
COMit are utilized to describe the ICT proxy over time, as mentioned earlier. The 
cost function in Equation (1) takes a translog form, the most frequently used form 
of the cost frontier in the banking literature, while the g-function in Equation (2) is 
assumed to be linear.  (cf., e.g., Lin and Lin, 2005). 
The translog functional Equation (1) can be re-written as follows:
β : the traditional  vector of unknown parameters to 
be estimated,
€ 
γ : the vector of unknown parameter to be estimated,
itu : a random variable to account for the truncated-
normally distributed cost inefficiency at the mean of 
the g-function,
€ 
vit : a random variable to describe the normally dis-
tributed disturbance, and
()⋅f : the optimized cost function of a given output 
vector and input prices.
€ 
ln(TC it /TAit ) = â0 + â1k ln pkit + â2s ln ysit +
1
2 â3kk' ln pkit ln pk' itk'=1
2
∑
k=1
2
∑
s=1
3
∑
k=1
2
∑
+ 12 â4ss' ln ysit ln ys' it + â5ks ln pkit ln ysits=1
3
∑
k=1
2
∑
s'=1
3
∑
s=1
3
∑ + zitγ + uit + vit
[3]
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where
ititit TALNy /1 =
€ 
y2it = TDit /TAit
ititit TAFIy /3 =
ititit TAwp /1 =
itit rp =2
Based on the model specifications above, we are able to employ the per-
formance measure of cost efficiency to assess the ICT effect and the international 
supervision across countries.
3. Data Sources and Statistical Hypothesis
 This section summarizes data sources, and statistics of variables. We also 
display the statistical hypothesis to be tested.
3.1 Data Sources
Our analysis is based on the variables from the financial statements (firm 
specific and microeconomic variables). Nevertheless, the country-level attributes 
are introduced to control the overall economic climates for different countries. The 
observation period ranges from 1993 to 2000. Due to the problem of missing val-
ues, unbalanced panel data are used. All data are dated at the end of the year. 
We categorize variables into two levels: firm-level and country-level. The 
firm-level variables are based on the financial statements gathered from the World 
Scope CD.5  A problem arising from the use of international accounting data is 
that accounting principles used in different countries differ, and there are diverse 
transformations of different foreign exchange rates. Nevertheless, the World Scope 
has made efforts to standardize the data. Moreover, by using a broader category of 
a variable, we alleviate the problems of varying definitions and measurement errors 
of accounting practices among different countries. Even though our firm-level data 
do not exhaust all banks in a country, they nonetheless represent a majority of the 
players of the industries in a country.
The country-level data are collected from the International Financial Sta-
tistics (IFS) published by the IMF and the World Development Indicator Database 
compiled by the World Bank. The base year of both data sets for all countries and 
all variables has been adjusted to the end of 1995. The two data sets that follow a 
universal format of variables serve as the comparable foundation across countries. 
In order to conduct cross-national comparisons, all monetary items have been de-
nominated into US dollars.
 
Following Dewan and Kraemer (1998, 2000) and Daveri (2001), the ICT 
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variables (including ITCS and COMCI) are obtained from the International Data 
Corporation (IDC), a private consulting firm specializing in high-tech industry re-
search. The ITCS variable is defined as the total revenue paid to vendors (includ-
ing channel markups) for hardware, data communications, software, and services. 
Since other official data sources are not available, this is the only source of ICT 
investments data for a large cross-section of countries in the 1990’s.  
3.2 Summary of Variables
The countries under study are listed in Table 1, where Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK and US participate in the Basel Accord, while the other countries 
are classified as non-Basel countries. The countries joining the Basel Accord are 
supervised by their domestic regulatory bodies in terms of the required capitals 
(called Basel I). 
Here, for the purpose of comparison, we further split the whole sample into 
two sub-samples: Basel countries and non-Basel countries. The Basel group con-
sists of thirteen countries and the sub-sample of the non-Basel group is constituted 
by thirty-eight countries. Table 2 shows statistic summary of the variables in the 
whole sample and sub-samples.
The whole sample contains 3494 observations from 51 countries under 
study; the sub-sample of Basel countries is composed of 1858 observations; and 
the sub-sample of non-Basel countries consists of 1636 observations.
It is insightful to compare the means of variables in different sub-samples. 
The comparative total costs of commercial banks (LNTC) in the Basel countries are 
lower than those in the non-Basel countries (-2.4435 vs. -1.8771). Very obviously, 
the total costs of the Basel countries must be larger than those of the non-Basel 
countries in terms of absolute value. Hence, we can conclude that the Basel coun-
tries are more cost-saving than the non-Basel countries in the comparative measure. 
Similarly, LNW of the Basel countries is smaller than that of the non-Basel coun-
tries (-5.8226 vs. -5.3248). Moreover, the cost of capital of Basel countries (0.5673) 
is again smaller than that of the non-Basel countries (1.8994). All these shows that 
the comparative input prices and total costs of the non-Basel countries are higher 
than those of the Basel countries.
Regarding the means of the three output variables LNLN, LNTD, and LNFI, 
we find that the Basel countries produce more LNLN and LNFI (-0.3474 vs. -
0.4166 and -1.8535 vs. -1.9993, respectively) but less LNTD (-0.7137 vs. -0.5467) 
than the non-Basel countries in the sample. This outcome shows that commercial 
banks in the Basel countries are bigger in terms of scale, amounts of loans, and the 
balances of financial investments (including long-term and short-term) than their 
counterparts in the non-Basel countries. The Basel countries benefit from sound 
regulations in banking and freedoms of international capital flows, so their banks 
are able to make more loans to companies in both Basel and non-Basel countries, 
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Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Korea (South)
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Singapore
Slovakia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Country Join Basel 
Accord or not
Country Join Basel 
Accord or not
Table 1: The List of Countries Under Study
  The Whole Sample Basel Countr ies Non-Basel Countr ies 
Va riable Mean  Std.De v. Obs Mean  Std.De v. Obs Mean  Std.De v. Obs 
LNTC  -2.1783  0.5709  3494  -2.4435  0.4922  1858  -1.8771  0.5005  1636  
LNW  -5.5895  1.3776  3494  -5.8226  1.3730  1858  -5.3248  1.3348  1636  
LNC  1.1910  1.2555  3494  0.5673  1.2054  185 8 1.8994  0.8793  1636  
LNLN -0.3798  0.2835  3494  -0.3474  0.2786  1858  -0.4166  0.2846  1636  
LNTD  -0.6355  0.8054  3494  -0.7137  0.9029  1858  -0.5467  0.6672  1636  
LNFI -1.9217  0.7625  3494  -1.8535  0.7718  1858  -1.9993  0.7445  1636  
PO L 78.1432  9.2946  3494  81.3119  4.86 53  1858  74.5446  11.5459  1636  
ECO  39.4446  4.3959  3494  40.7832  2.8840  1858  37.9245  5.2429  1636  
FIN 42.5595  5.1885  3494  44.5151  3.8313  1858  40.3386  5.6178  1636  
IT 8.4125  14.8792  3494  5.9071  9.7321  1858  11.2578  18.7129  1636  
COM  10.9078  19.9142  3494  8.6934  9.0942  1858  13.4227  27.2287  1636  
 
Notes:
The dependent variable of the cost frontier is LNTCit, where LNTC=ln(TC/TA). LNLN=ln(LN/TA), 
LNTDit=ln(TD/TA), LNFI=ln(FI/TA), LNW=ln(w/TA), and LNC=ln(r) with r being the real price of capital. 
The control variables represented by country risk variables are FIN= country financial risk, POL= country 
political risk, and ECO= country economic risk.
Std. Dev. represents the standard deviation and Obs means the number of observations.
Table 2: Summary of Statistics
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which results in the higher LNLN in the Basel countries. They also enjoy a variety 
of financial instruments that allow their commercial banks to diversify their risks. 
Thus, the commercial banks in the Basel countries invest more heavily than those 
in the non-Basel countries. In contrast, people in some developing countries (all 
of them are non-Basel countries) tend to deposit a majority of their disposable in-
comes. Thus, the LNTD in the non-Basel countries is larger than that in the Basel 
countries.
The means of the three z control variables POL, ECO, and FIN for the Basel 
countries are unanimously bigger than those for the non-Basel countries (POL: 
81.3119 vs.74.5446; ECO: 40.7832 vs. 37.9245; and FIN: 44.5151 vs. 40.3386). 
This comparison signals that the Basel countries bear lower political, economic, 
and financial risks than the non-Basel countries. 
The IT and COM variables for the Basel countries are on average smaller 
than those for the non-Basel countries (IT: 5.9071 vs. 11.2578 and COM: 8.6934 
vs. 13.4227, respectively). Since many non-Basel countries are emerging econo-
mies that have enjoyed rapid technological changes in recent years, their ICT in-
vestments are larger in terms of growth rates. In addition, the standard deviations 
of all variables are listed for references.
3.3 Statistical Hypotheses
In this study, we are interested in the impact of the international supervision 
in accordance with the Basel Accord and that of the affect of the ICT investments. 
Therefore, two hypotheses H1 and H2 are proposed. These two hypotheses are 
tested on the basis of the two-equation model. These three hypotheses are:
 
H1:   B (the proxy for the Basel countries) has a positive impact on cost efficiency. 
(i.e., B is statistically negative in Equation (2).)
H2:   IT investments exert a positive effect on cost efficiency. (i.e., the coefficient 
of IT is statistically negative in Equation (2).)
H3:  COM investments have a positive impact on cost efficiency. (i.e., the coef-
ficient of COM is statistically negative in Equation (2).)
If H1 is not rejected, it is efficient for a country to join the Basel Accord to 
improve the operations of commercial banking. If H2 is not rejected, the IT invest-
ments would lead to the increase in the cost efficiency of the banks in the Basel 
countries and the non-Basel countries as well. If H3 is not rejected, it is efficient to 
invest in COM to improve the operation of commercial banks. Moreover, if neither 
H1, nor H2, nor H3 is rejected for the whole sample, then ICT investments and the 
international regulations are the essential factors (sources) that improve the cost 
efficiency. 
4. Analysis of Empirical Results
This subsection discusses the empirical results of Equations (1) and (2). 
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Table 3 shows estimates of the cost frontiers of the whole sample and two sub-
samples and Table 4 demonstrates results of the sub- time periods of years 1997, 
1998, and 1999.
 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant -0.4647 -3.79 * * * -2.6475 -14.47 * * * -0.4556 -1.42
LNW 0.3063 11.86 * * * 0.2624 8.57 * * * 0.1035 1.66 *
LNC 0.4496 17.20 * * * 0.4981 9.31 * * * 0.3973 6.14 * * *
LNLN -0.1960 -2.30 * * -0.5735 -3.19 * * * 0.5448 2.00 * *
LNTD -0.2728 -7.26 * * * -0.3270 -8.50 * * * -0.5097 -5.54 * * *
LNFI 0.0208 0.60   -0.1446 -2.36 * *  0.0195 0.16
W*C 0.0218 3.23 * * * 0.0451 5.60 * * * 0.0465 2.79 * * *
WSQ 0.0482 15.36 * * * 0.0495 12.55 * * * 0.0194 2.90 * * *
CSQ -0.0132 -4.08 * * * 0.1066 10.86 * * * 0.0173 1.89 *
LN*TD -0.0993 -5.31 * * * -0.0439 -1.79 *   0.1144 2.28 * *
LN*FI -0.1866 -8.23 * * * 0.1115 1.98 * *  -0.1801 -3.22 * * *
TD*FI -0.0267 -4.37 * * * 0.0017 0.21    -0.0425 -2.21 * *
LNSQ 0.1771 4.26 * * * -0.0069 -0.08    0.3305 2.74 * * *
FISQ 0.0171 2.20 * * -0.0074 -0.50    0.0358 1.34
TDSQ -0.0134 -2.77 * * * -0.0557 -9.78 * * * 0.0130 1.47
LN*W -0.0229 -1.81 *  -0.1012 -4.99 * * * 0.0529 1.57
LN*C 0.1079 7.21 * * * -0.0592 -1.21    0.0313 0.90
TD*W -0.0164 -3.05 * * * -0.0052 -1.15    -0.0576 -3.97 * * *
TD*C 0.0014 0.20   0.0108 1.06    0.0809 6.04 * * *
FI*W 0.0115 2.41 * * -0.0017 -0.24    -0.0042 -0.29
FI*C 0.0428 6.54 * * * 0.0585 3.25 * * * 0.0186 1.20
POL -0.0032 -5.68 * * * -0.0016 -1.66 *   -0.0026 -2.31 * *
ECO -0.0241 -21.43 * * * 0.0005 0.30  -0.0333 -11.76 * * *
FIN -0.0053 -4.78 * * * 0.0024 1.54 -0.0051 -2.28 * *
 
IT -0.0016 -0.32   -0.0035 -5.87 * * * 0.0089 1.58
COM 0.0234 3.17 * * * 0.0003 0.22 0.0111 1.65 *
B -1.3847 -6.55 * * * - - - -
Lambda 1.8189 16.83 * * * 1.2100 14.73 * * * 0.9596 16.38 * * *
Sigma 0.3580 23.29 * * * 0.2476 40.60 * * * 0.2283 18.07 * * *
Equation (1)
All Countries Basel Countries Non-Basel Countries
Equation (2)
Table 3:  The Empirical Results of the Cost Frontiers 
Notes:
*, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The notations of variables are as described in Sub-section 2.1.
The dependent variable of the cost frontier is LNTC, where LNTC=ln(TC/TA). LNLN=ln(LN/TA), 
LNTD=ln(TD/TA), LNFI=ln(FI/TA), LNW=ln(w/TA), and LNC=ln(r), , where r = the real price of capital. The 
interaction terms are products of the input prices and outputs. These are:
W*C= LNW*LNC, WSQ= LNW*LNW, CSQ=  LNC*LNC, LN*TD= LNLN*LNTD,
LN*FI= LNLN*LNFI, TD*FI= LNTD*LNFI, LNSQ= LNLN*LNLN, FISQ= LNFI*LNFI, TDSQ= 
LNTD*LNTD, LN*W= LNLN*LNW, LN*C= LNLN*LNC, TD*W= LNTD*LNW, TD*C= LNTD*LNC, 
FI*W= LNFI*LNW, and FI*C= LNFI*LNC
The control variables represented by country risk variables are FIN= country financial risk, POL= country 
political risk, and ECO= country economic risk.
Lambda= 
vu σσ  and Sigma = 22 vu σσ +  . B is the Basel Country Proxy.
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4.1 Analysis of the Whole Time Periods
According to Table 3, in the whole sample, our empirical result of Equation 
(1) shows that the input prices LNW and LNC are positively related with the total 
cost (LNTC) and two outputs (LNLN and LNTD) are negatively linked to LNTC, 
while the other output variable LNFI is insignificant. The three control variables 
POL, ECO, and FIN are significantly and negatively associated with LNTC. Since 
high control variables represent a low risk, our result reveals that the lower risk a 
country bears, the lower the total cost of banks in that country is.
In Equation (2), IT reduces the cost inefficiency itu but the impact is insig-
nificant. Nevertheless, COM strongly contributes to the cost inefficiency signifi-
cantly at the 1% level. Moreover, the Basel Accord proxy B is significantly and 
negatively related to the cost inefficiency, implying that the international regula-
tions improve on the cost efficiency of the banks in the sample countries. The ab-
solute value of the coefficient of B is larger than that of COM (-1.3847 vs. 0.0234) 
and its absolute t-value is also larger (-6.55 vs. 3.17). This outcome signals that 
the telecommunications investments seriously deteriorate the cost efficiency of the 
banks in the countries under study, and the both the IT and the Basel Accord proxy 
B are more important factors in improving the cost efficiency of commercial banks 
than COM. That is, H1 is not rejected in the whole sample. 
We further divide the whole sample into two sub-samples: Basel countries 
and non-Basel countries and concentrate on the results of Equation (2). Interest-
ingly, it is observed that IT mitigates the cost inefficiency of commercial banks 
in the sub-sample of the Basel countries, while the impact of COM on the cost 
inefficiency stays insignificant. That is, H2 of IT is not rejected but H3 of COM is 
rejected for the sub-sample of the Basel countries. In the sub-sample of the non-
Basel countries, IT does not exert a significant impact on the cost inefficiency and 
the effect caused by COM is significant only at the 10% level. In other words, H2 
of IT and H3 of COM are rejected for the non-Basel countries.
This outcome signals that 1) commercial banks in the non-Basel countries 
cannot align the ICT investments with their operations; 2) IT investments alone, but 
COM investments alone do not, enhance the cost efficiency of commercial banks; 
and 3) the COM investments are capital-using for the whole sample and the sub-
sample of the non-Basel countries, and they seem indifferent toward the cost effi-
ciency for the sub-sample of the Basel countries. Without good supervisory regula-
tions, the commercial banks in a country cannot outperform their counterparts by 
using the COM investments. In other words, IT investments help banks save cost 
only when appropriate regulations and standards are well-established. 
In addition, we have investigated the lag effect of ICT investments on the 
cost efficiency but the impact stays insignificant. Therefore, the results are not 
shown here. The empirical results related to the lag effects of IT and COM are 
available upon request.
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4.2 Analysis of Years 1997, 1998 and 1999
It is insightful to analyze the empirical results of sub-periods. By doing so, 
we can depict the time-varying patterns of the cost efficiency for different years. 
Unfortunately, the empirical results of the stochastic frontiers for 1993, 1994, 1995, 
1996, and 2000 are not obtainable due to the wrong skewness of the dependent 
variable. Therefore, the results for these years are not shown here.
In Table 4, we find that the input price variables LNC and LNW are posi-
Year
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant -1.4365 -4.25 * * * -1.2126 -2.79 * * * -1.2003 -1.93 *
LNW 0.1763 2.99 * * * 0.2900 3.91 * * * 0.1471 1.59
LNC 0.2525 3.70 * * * 0.6582 8.06 * * * 0.4903 3.96 * * *
LNLN -0.1958 -0.56 -0.1497 -0.33 0.0299 0.07
LNTD -0.5771 -6.76 * * * -0.7277 -7.34 * * * -0.1227 -1.24
LNFI -0.0417 -0.37 -0.0578 -0.36 -0.0438 -0.20
W*C 0.0245 1.69 * 0.0583 3.27 * * * 0.0224 1.25
WSQ 0.0424 6.01 * * * 0.0546 6.05 * * * 0.0278 2.66 * * *
CSQ 0.0434 2.46 * * 0.1483 6.57 * * * 0.1058 5.05 * * *
LN*TD -0.0742 -1.21 -0.1135 -2.58 * * * -0.0402 -0.45
LN*FI -0.1810 -1.82 * -0.2819 -2.55 * * 0.0383 0.26
TD*FI -0.0247 -2.12 * * -0.0370 -3.15 * * * -0.0027 -0.13
LNSQ 0.0041 0.02 0.0294 0.14 0.3507 1.39
FISQ 0.0178 0.60 0.0237 0.66 0.0324 0.48
TDSQ -0.0457 -4.19 * * * -0.0453 -3.95 * * * -0.0259 -1.50
LN*W -0.0867 -2.57 * * -0.0115 -0.29 -0.0420 -0.86
LN*C -0.2691 -4.44 * * * 0.0015 0.02 0.1455 1.55
TD*W -0.0382 -4.00 * * * -0.0237 -2.18 * * 0.0130 1.20
TD*C 0.0589 3.02 * * * 0.2538 8.19 * * * 0.0523 2.31 * *
FI*W -0.0114 -0.89 -0.0025 -0.17 -0.0091 -0.40
FI*C -0.0178 -0.79 0.0606 2.48 * * 0.0669 1.74 *
POL 0.0018 1.10 -0.0002 -0.12 -0.0051 -2.45 * *
ECO -0.0093 -2.68 * * * -0.0329 -7.28 * * * -0.0046 -0.73
FIN -0.0175 -4.70 * * * 0.0040 1.12 -0.0204 -3.39 * * *
IT 0.0215 5.18 * * * -0.0053 -1.94 * -0.0046 -3.77 * * *
COM 0.0007 0.19 0.0163 3.45 * * * -0.0148 -3.78 * * *
B 0.4945 3.82 * * * 0.2883 2.81 * * * 0.3709 3.42 * * *
Lambda 1.9408 8.63 * * * 1.9918 7.60 * * * 1.8252 8.92 * * *
Sigma 0.3274 17.78 * * * 0.3602 17.68 * * * 0.3742 20.71 * * *
Equation (1)
Equation (2)
1997 1998 1999
 
Notes:
*, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The notations of variables are as described in Sub-section 2.1.
The dependent variable of the cost frontier is LNTC, where LNTC=ln(TC/TA). LNLN=ln(LN/TA), 
LNTD=ln(TD/TA), LNFI=ln(FI/TA), LNW=ln(w/TA), and LNC=ln(r), , where r = the real price of capital. The 
interaction terms are products of the input prices and outputs (for simplicity, the subscripts i and t are omitted if 
the omission causes no confusion). These are:
W*C= LNW*LNC, WSQ= LNW*LNW, CSQ=  LNC*LNC, LN*TD= LNLN*LNTD,
LN*FI= LNLN*LNFI, TD*FI= LNTD*LNFI, LNSQ= LNLN*LNLN, FISQ= LNFI*LNFI, TDSQ= 
LNTD*LNTD, LN*W= LNLN*LNW, LN*C= LNLN*LNC, TD*W= LNTD*LNW, TD*C= LNTD*LNC, 
FI*W= LNFI*LNW, and FI*C= LNFI*LNC
The control variables represented by country risk variables are FIN= country financial risk, POL= country 
political risk, and ECO= country economic risk.
Lambda= vu σσ  and Sigma =
22
vu σσ +  . B is the Basel proxy.
Table 4: The Empirical Results of the Cost Frontiers for Years 1997, 1998 and 1999
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tively related to the LNTC for 1997, 1998 and 1999. Therefore, the input prices 
contribute positively to the total costs. Two output variables LNTD and LNFI are 
negatively related to the total costs for 1997, 1998 and 1999 while LNLN is nega-
tively related to LNTC for 1997 and 1998 but positively related to LNTC in 1999. 
In addition, the results of the z variables of country risks vary from year to year.
The results of ICT (IT and COM) investments and the Basel proxy from 
Equation (2) are our focal point. We find that IT is positively linked to the cost 
inefficiency for 1997 but negatively and significantly associated with the cost inef-
ficiency for 1998 (at the 10% significance level) and 1999 (at the 1% significance 
level). These estimates over time suggest that the IT investments tend to contribute 
to the cost efficiency of commercial banks more and more deeply as time goes by. 
The COM variable remains insignificant for 1997 and positively related to the cost 
inefficiency for 1998. However, it mitigates the cost inefficiency (i.e., enhances the 
cost efficiency) for 1999. Consequently, COM tends to reduce the cost efficiency 
for 1998 but improve it for 1999. In other words, the changing pattern of the effect 
of COM on the cost efficiency is shifting favorably through time.
Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the Basel proxy B indicate that the 
international supervision on commercial banks unanimously increases the cost ineffi-
ciency significantly at the 1% level for all the three sub-periods, 1997, 1998, and 1999. 
This evidence reveals the fact that it is capital-using for a bank to align its operations 
with the international Basel Accord for each year, though it is beneficial to banks in the 
long run (i.e., the observation periods are longer than one year) as shown in Table 3.
5. Conclusions
This article has explored the impacts of the ICT (IT and COM) investments 
on the cost efficiency of commercial banks for 51 nations including both countries 
joining the Basel Accord and the other economies. In the analysis via the stochastic 
frontier approach, we have found that IT investments are significant in improving 
the cost efficiency of the banks in the countries in the Basel Accord.  COM invest-
ments tend to affect the cost efficiency negatively, particularly for the whole sample 
combining the Basel and the non-Basel countries. Furthermore, the analysis for the 
three sub-periods has indicated that participating in the Basel Accord is capital-us-
ing in the short run (i.e., in the cross-sectional analysis) but cost-saving in the long 
run (i.e., in the whole panel data set). In addition, the impacts of the ICT invest-
ments on the cost efficiency become stronger and stronger from 1997 to 1999. In 
other words, the time-varying patterns of the effects of IT and COM upon the cost 
efficiency are favourable.
Obviously, our analysis contributes to technology policy and management, 
international e-banking, and international supervisions in banking. We have found 
that IT investments, instead of the telecommunications investments, of a country 
are important source of the cost efficiency of commercial banks. Moreover, this 
study provides a strategic implication for the international banking market. Once 
the deregulation across countries takes place, financial institutions facilitated with 
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IT investments in highly efficient countries would invade the banking markets in 
the countries with low IT investments and cost efficiencies. On the other hand, the 
banks in the non-Basel countries can adopt successful e-banking models and inter-
national supervisions to leapfrog over their counterparts in the Basel countries.   
 
Given this research project, there are some possible extensions. First, the 
new Basel Accord (usually called Basel II), which will be implemented, calls for 
the three-pillar regulations. Therefore, an extended new analysis is needed in ex-
ploring the impact of the new Basel Accord. Second, different ownership structures 
of financial institutions such as public-owned and private-owned may be considered 
in the field of international e-banking. Third, commercial banks in several countries 
(e.g., U.S.) have started to sell life insurance policies to clients. Consequently, the 
boundary between the banking and insurance industries is becoming blurred. New 
research on this new wave of conglomerates of financial institutions is necessary. 
And fourth, an in-depth discussion on how ICT investments under the new Basel 
Accord improve the cost efficiency of banks is imperative. It is not satisfactory to 
find out that the countries in the Basel Accord outperform others in the cost ef-
ficiency of commercial banking. We want to know the details of the procedure of 
adopting new technologies and supervisions to improve cost efficiency.
All in all, the ultimate goal of the ICT investments is to maximize a firm’s 
market value of stocks through the improvement of cost efficiency. Consequently, 
it is important to investigate how ICT investments are linked to the profit and stock 
prices of a firm at the microeconomic level and to the GDP of a country at the mac-
roeconomic level in future research. These interesting empirical problems await 
future efforts to solve them. The solution to these problems will further enrich and 
benefit the practice of international banking.
In closing, the present study has made multifold contributions to the lit-
erature of finance and banking: theoretically sound, methodologically correct, and 
empirically rich.
Endnotes
1 
The Basel Accord is an agreement defined by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) that is an interna-
tional organization which fosters international monetary and financial cooperation for central banks that regulate 
commercial banks.
2 
The interaction terms in the translog function are products of the input prices and outputs (for simplicity, the 
subscripts i and t are omitted if the omission causes no confusion).
W*C= LNW*LNC, WSQ= LNW*LNW, CSQ= LNC*LNC, LN*TD= LNLN*LNTD,
LN*FI= LNLN*LNFI, TD*FI= LNTD*LNFI, LNSQ= LNLN*LNLN, FISQ= LNFI*LNFI, TDSQ= 
LNTD*LNTD, LN*W= LNLN*LNW, LN*C= LNLN*LNC, TD*W= LNTD*LNW, TD*C= LNTD*LNC, 
FI*W= LNFI*LNW, and FI*C= LNFI*LNC.
3
 The stochastic frontier approach includes both cross-sectional and panel data analyses. Here, we adopt the 
panel-data form of it.
4 
 IT and COM should be considered in the g-function as exogenous factors because the collected data of the ICT 
variables are country-specific, not firm-specific.
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Appendix: Definitions of Three Country Risk Indicators
The political risk rating (POL) measures the political stability of a country. It is composed of 12 com-
ponents: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, 
corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, 
and bureaucracy quality. The economic risk (ECO) components include GDP per Head, Real GDP Growth, An-
nual Inflation Rate, Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP, and Current Account as a percentage of GDP. The 
financial risk index (FIN) is rated by the Percentage of Foreign Debt to GDP, Foreign Debt Service as a Percent-
age of Exports of Goods and Services, Current Account as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services, Net 
International Liquidity as Months of Import Cover, and Exchange Rate Stability. For these three indicators, the 
higher rating means lower risk.
